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Against a universal definition of đtypeĒ
Tomas Petricek 





What is the definition of Ŷtypeŷ? Having a clear and precise 
answer to this question would avoid many misunderstandings 
and prevent meaningless discussions that arise from them. But 
having such clear and precise answer to this question would 
DOVR KXUW VFLHQFH ĔKDPSHU WKH JURZWK RI NQRZOHGJHĕ1 and 
ĔGHIOHFW WKH FRXUVH RI LQYHVWLJDWLRQ LQWR QDUURZ FKDQQHOV RI
things already understoRGĕ2.  
In this essay, I argue that not everything we work with 
needs to be precisely defined. There are many definitions used 
by different communities, but none of them applies universally. 
A brief excursion into philosophy of science shows that this is 
not just tolerable, but necessary for progress. Philosophy also 
suggests how we can think about this imprecise notion of type.  
 
Science is PXFKPRUHŶVORSS\ŷDQGŶLUUDWLRQDOŷthan its 
methodological image. 
(Against Method, Paul Feyerabend)3 
Introduction 
Probably no other term in programming languages attracts as 
much aWWHQWLRQDQGDUJXPHQWVDV đW\SHĒAlthough there are 
many formal definitions, in practice a đtypeĒ it is often used as 
a vaguely defined term with emotions attached to it. 
Those with negative emotions towards types will blame 
types for failures that may not be caused by any fundamental 
property of types. For example, you could blame types for the 
verbosity of Java, but an ML user familiar with type inference 
will quickly object.  
On the other hand, the proponents of types will often 
praise types for properties that are not essential for types and 
can be achieved in other ways. For example, editor support 
 
1 Lakatos (1976), 74 
2 Feyerabend (2010), 200 
3 Feyerabend (2010), 160 
(e.g. auto-completion) can be attributed to types, but there are 
systems providing similar features not based on types. 
WHGLVDJUHHHYHQZKHQZHĒUHRQWKHVDPHVLGHRIWKHEDUUL-
cade. For example, traditional arguments for types have been 
language safety and more efficient compilation. The recent 
7\SH6FULSW ODQJXDJH DGGV đW\SHVĒ WR -DvaScript, but its type 
system is intentionally unsound (hence no language safety) and 
types are erased when code is translated to JavaScript (hence 
no increased efficiency). ,VLWVWLOODđVWDWLFDOO\W\SHGĒZKHQLWLV
unsound? And has the purpose of types silently changed here?  
If we review academic literature concerning types, we find 
a number of formal definitions. But each definition comes with 
a different intuition behind types, different tools for working 
with then and also different motivation for using types4. Thus 
those looking for a universal definition of a type that would 
apply to all the uses are determined to fail. The meaning of a 
type also changes over time (we usually do not notice) and 
different uses require different properties (that often do not 
share a common ground). 
If we look past the aura of perfection surrounding science, 
ZHĒOOILQGWKDWWKLVLVQRWDQXQFRPPRQVLWXDWLRQ$QGLQIDFW
many philosophers of science argue that it is healthy and 
necessary state of affairs. 
In this essay, I argue that we do not need a formal universal 
definition of a type. I discuss the issue from the perspective of 
philosophy of science, looking how similar issues have been 
treated in mathematics, philosophy of language and sciences.  
I first discuss how the meaning of types differs between 
communities and how it changes over time. Then I look for 
arguments supporting the idea that the notion of đtypeĒ should 
be left undefined. Finally, I discuss options for living in such 
unsatisfying (but realistic) world without exact definitions. 
 
4 7KHELJJHVWGLYLGHLGHQWLILHGE\.HOOLVEHWZHHQđH[SUHVVLRQW\SHVĒ
arising from the logical traditLRQDQGđGDWDW\SHVĒIROORZLQJDQHQJLQHHULQJ
tradition. In this essay, I look at some of the finer distinction within the 
logical tradition. Even one side of this big divide is surprisingly complex! 
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How the meaning of types changes 
Allow me to start with a personal anecdote. I was recently 
supervising the Types course and the lecture notes describe the 
uses of types and type systems as follows5: 
1. Detecting errors via type-checking, statically or dynamically 
2. Abstraction and support for structuring large systems 
3. Documentation 
4. (IģFLHQF\ 
5. Whole-language safety 
My students were already indoctrinated and did not question 
the list6. Indeed, past languages used types for all of the reasons 
above. Nowadays, types are used for some of the reasons, but 
rarely all of them. As already mentioned, TypeScript sacrifices 
safety (5) and efficiency (4) and uses types for documentation 
(3) and limited compile-time error detection (1). Julia7 goes 
further and uses types, but not for rejecting programs8. Types 
are still important for expressiveness (not on our list), system 
structuring (2) and documentation (3). 
Types can even be used for none of the above reasons 
(consider proving mathematical theorems using Coq) and if we 
look further in the history, types were invented by Russell to 
avoid paradoxes in foundations of mathematics. No doubt, he 
would be surprised by the list! 
If we now follow the development of types from Russell 
to modern programming, wHĒOOILQGdifferent definitions leading 
to different intuitions and use cases for types, even if we stay 
just within the narrow đORJLFDOWUDGLWLRQĒ. 
From foundations of mathematics to the lambda calculus 
Types first appeared in 5XVVHOOĒVpaper Mathematical logic as 
based on the theory of types in 1908. He uses types to avoid 
paradoxes of the kind ĔFODVVRIDOOFODVVHVWKDWGRQRWFRQWDLQ
themselves as elementsĕ Compared with types in program-
ming5XVVHOOĒVW\SHVKDYHquite different definition and uses.  
A type is defined as the range of significance of a propo-
sitional function, i.e., as the collection of arguments for 
which the said function has values.10 
First of all, Russell defines types of propositions based on their 
inputs (what we would call domain). This contrasts with the 
use in programming where types are often interpreted as the 
sets of results of an expression, or the range. However, what 
types are does not matter to Russell: źIt is unnecessary, in 
 
5 Pitts (2015) 
6 What's really demanded in the Church of Reason is not ability, but 
inability. Then you are considered teachable. A truly able person is always 
a threat. Pirsig (1999), 392. 
7 Julia documentation (2015) 
SUDFWLFHWRNQRZZKDWREMHFWVEHORQJWRWKHORZHVWW\SHƁ)RULQ
practice, only the relative types of variables are relevant.Ż The 
paper does not build on this definition and instead works with 
a hierarchy of types such that propositions containing variables 
of type ݊ are assigned type ݊ ൅  ?. The theory of types then 
avoids contradictions arising from self-reference as follows: 
[W]KHQDPDQVD\Vź,DPO\LQJŻZHPXVWLQWHUSUHWKLP
DV PHDQLQJ ź7KHUH LV D SURSRVLWLRQ RI RUGHU ݊ which I 
DIILUPDQGZKLFKLVIDOVHŻ7KLV is a proposition of order ݊ ൅  ?; hence the man is not affirming any proposition of 
order ݊; hence this statement is false and yet its falsehood 
GRHVQRWLPSO\ƁWKDWKHLVPDNLQJDWUXHVWDWHPHQW11 
Also note that RussellĒVW\SHVGRQRWUXOHRXWSURSRVLtions as 
invalid. Instead, they change their meaning to avoid the contra-
diction. :HFDQVWLOOVD\Ĕ,DPO\LQJĕEXWLWPHDQVDGLIIHUHQW
thing than without types. So, while there is a clear connection 
EHWZHHQ5XVVHOOĒVW\SHVDQGW\SHVLQSURJUDPPLQJLWZould be 
a mistake to think that they are really the same. 
5XVVHOOĒVW\SHVLQVSLUHG&KXUFKĒVZRUNRQɉ-calculus. It is 
important to understand that back then, the ɉ-calculus was not 
understood as a simple programming language. It appeared 
(together with 7XULQJĒVPDFKLQHVDQGthe theory of recursive 
functions) as an attempt to formaOL]HđHIIHFWLYHFRPSXWDELOLW\Ē
that is a class of computations that can be carried out by 
mechanically (by a human) following a set of rules. 
&KXUFKĒV paper is a contribution to the foundations of 
mathematics. He discusses how to combine the formalism of ɉ-
calculus with the theory of types. However, Church does not 
elaborate on possible uses of this system. In particular, he does 
not OLQN WKH V\VWHP WR 5XVVHOOĒV SDUDGR[HV and his original 
paper does not discuss which ɉ-terms cannot be assigned a type 
ď a crucial use case for programming languages! 
Church uses types as a purely formal construct. His system 
includes two base types; ߧ for propositions and ߡ for indivi-
duals, but he does not define what his types denote: 
We purposely refrain from making more definite the 
nature of the types ߧ and ߡ, the formal theory admitting of 
a variety of interpretations in this regard.14 
Although &KXUFKĒVnotion of types is formally close to types in 
functional programming languages, the intuition behind types 
was very different. Church GLGQRWVHHW\SHVDVĔVHWVRISRVVLEOH
8 A popular slogan is that Julia uses the type system in all the ways that don't 
end with the programmer arguing with the compiler, Hanson (2013). 
10 Russell (1908), 236 
11 Russell (1908), 240 




does not introduce type systems in order to rule out certain 
terms. In other words, none of the points from the list at the 
beginning of this section applies to &KXUFKĒVW\SHGɉ-calculus. 
From expression types to computation types 
The nowadays common interpretation of types as sets of values 
appeared much later than types themselves. This development 
is interesting because it is where the logical tradition (types in ɉ-calculus) meets the engineering tradition (data storage in 
computers). According to Priestley, the view appeared in early 
1970s thanks to Hoare, building on the work of McCarthy:  
[0F&DUWK\ŷV theory] was further developed by Hoare, 
who proposed that data types in programming language 
could be understood as denoting sets of data values.15 
The new theory of types influenced early programming langua-
ges like Pascal and ML. As Priestley points out, treating types 
as sets had its issues, for example źWKHUHLVQRREYLRXVVHW-theoretic 
DQDORJXHWRSRLQWHUVŻ16.  
Many people using programming languages nowadays 
intuitively see types as sets. This is so fundamental idea that it 
is hard to unsee. Indeed, we are tempted to interpret the types 
LQ &KXUFKĒV VLPSO\ W\SHG ɉ-calculus as sets too. However, 
doing so is a misinterpretation of the original work. This is not 
a problem for normal science, but it matters when we try to 
get at the core of what types are. In other words, there is a 
small subtle change in how we think about types and we might 
not even notice it if we are not explicitly searching for it! 
The subtle change in the meaning of types affects not just 
what types are, but also what can be done with them. When 
we see types as sets, it makes sense to prove that evaluating a 
program of a certain type produces values that belong to the 
set denoted by this type. This is the key principle behind the 
syntactic approach to type soundness introduced by Wright 
and Felleisen19 and taught in standard textbooks on types. In 
summary, seeing types in a certain way leads to different 
intuition behind them (things that do not fit the intuition well 
will appear in later chapters of our textbooks, if at all) and it 
also shapes what questions about types can be asked. 
However, seeing types as sets of values is not the end of 
the story. Another slight shift in the meaning of types comes 
with the development of type and effect systems and monads21. 
Here, the type captures not just the set of produced values, but 
also information about other effects that the computation has.  
 
15 Priestley (2011), 246 
16 ibid. 247. We cannot see pointers as sets of addresses, because there is a 
difference between a pointer to a record and a pointer to an integer. Treat-
ing pointers as sets of addresses would now require a model of memory! 
Consider the following example, which uses two reference 
cells ݎ and ݏ allocated in separate memory regions ߩ and ߪ, 
respectively, and assigns the value from ݏ (read using Ĕ!ĕ) to ݎ: ݎǣ ఘǡ ݏǣ ఙ ٟ ݎ ؔ Ǩݏ ׷ Ƭሼߩǡߪሽ 
Here, the type and effect of the expression tells us that the 
computation returns a value of type unit (which is an uninte-
resting singleton set) and also writes to a memory region ߩ and 
reads from a memory region ߪ. 
When we consider effect systems, thinking of types as sets 
becomes difficult. If we ignore the effects, we are leaving out a 
crucial part of the story. If we attempt to integrate effects into 
the sets, our sets become extremely complex (a set of numbers 
turns into a set of functions that take a model of the world and 
produce an integer together with a new world). At this point, 
it might be easier to find a different meaning for types that does 
not lead to such complexity. What we are facing here is akin 
to Kuhnian paradigm shift. When it becomes hard to solve 
puzzles using the established methods, scientists adopt different 
definitions and different methods. One such alternative view 
that lets us talk about effects is to treat types as relations that 
has been advocated by Benton in his 2014 talk: 
Express meaning of high-level types as relational, exten-
sional constraints on the behaviour of compiled code22 
In this view, the type of the above expression specifies that, for 
all memory regions, the value after performing the compu-
tation is the same as the value before, with the exception of the 
region ߩ. This view also changes the purpose of types (Benton 
claims that ź7\SHVDUHDERXWDEVWUDFWLRQVQRWDERXWHUURUVŻ) and 
perhaps more importantly, we also need to change our methods 
for working with types. For example, the notion of syntactic 
type safety becomes meaningless.  
Dependent types and homotopy type theory 
From the practical perspective, dependent types aim to make 
types more precise. A type of an array might include the size 
of the array, making it possible to verify the absence of out-of-
bounds accesses statically23. Here, we can think of types as sets, 
but again, dependent types go further and allow specifying 
more complex program properties that (like memory effects), 
do not fit this view.  
More interestingly, dependent types can be also seen as 
going back to the logic and foundations of mathematics:  
19 Wright, Felleisen (1994) 
21 Lucassen, Gifford (1988) 
22 Benton (2014) 
23 This example follows Chlipala (2014), 8  
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Generalizing the [Curry-Howard] correspondence to ¿rst-
order predicate logic naturally leads to dependent types.24   
Dependent types introduces two notable type constructors: de-
pendent functions and dependent pairs. Those correspond to 
universal and existential quantifiers from predicate logic. Both 
can be interpreted as sets, but again, we soon face issues that 
are difficult to resolve using the set-based model. This might, 
in part, be a reason for the recent interest in homotopy type 
theory, which uses yet another interpretation of types:  
The central new idea in homotopy type theory is that types 
can be regarded as spaces in homotopy theory, or higher-
dimensional groupoids in category theory.26 
Dependently typed programming and homotopy type theory 
also change what types are good for. Rather than focusing on 
programming (the list from the beginning of the section), types 
are now used for theorem proving (through their connection 
with logic) and for building foundations of mathematics.  
Unsound and relatively sounds type systems 
So far, we could think that there is an ultimate ideal notion of 
type that we are slowly getting closer to. However, the 
following two developments happen in parallel with the one 
discussed last and they take very different directions.  
TypeScript and Dart are two languages that both compile 
to JavaScript and both have an unsound type system. They are 
not unsafe27, because the execution engine checks types 
dynamically. The focus of types is shifting from provable 
correctness to documentation and tool support. According to 
Bracha, types in Dart provide the following benefits: 
- Documentation for humans. It is much easier for people to 
read your code if it has judiciously placed type annotations. 
- Documentation for machines. Tools can leverage type 
annotations in various wD\VƁ 
- Early error detection. Dart provides a static checker that can 
ZDUQ\RXDERXWSRWHQWLDOSUREOHPVƁ28 
The first two points view types as documentation, either for 
humans or for machines or to enable tooling such as navigation 
and auto-completion. Types in Dart are not unlike types in 
other modern programming languages, but we can see another 
shift in their meaning. In the sense discussed by Hoare and 
Benton, types in Dart and TypeScript do not ĔPHDQDQ\WKLQJĕ. 
Types are still used for (limited) error detection but their main 
 
24 Aspinall, D., Hofmann (2005), 48 
26 Univalent Foundations Program (2013), 62 
27 In the usual sense, i.e. that a program could cause unchecked runtime error 
28 Bracha (2011); performance become less important in later work on Dart 
purpose shifts from safety to documentation and tool support. 
This might be a small step for a programmer, but it is a giant 
(and unacceptable) leap for a mathematician.  
Finally, the third development comes with type providers 
in F# and Idris29. Type providers extend the type system with 
the ability to programmatically generate types based on exter-
nal data. For example, the World Bank type provider imports 
countries as types with indicators as statically checked fields. 
Does this change what types mean? When we have a type such 
DV Ĕ&]HFK5HSXEOLFĕ it is better seen as an individual of an 
information science ontology30, then as a set! 
Type providers are interesting, because they do not intro-
duce unsoundness per se (F# is very strict about types in many 
ways). However, the soundness of programs becomes relative 
with respect to some aspects of the external world. A program 
accessing information about Czech Republic is sound as long as 
the country does not disappear from the external data source.  
Type providers are yet another development of both 
meaning and purpose of types. Types serve for both error 
checking (with a relativized twist) and as a documentation for 
a human and a machine (to provide auto-complete), but at the 
same time, they require quite different intuition.  
A universal definition of type 
This incomplete review shows that types are not a single well 
defined concept. Sometimes, but not always, we can find a 
precise definition, but none of the definitions can capture all 
the uses that we find throughout the history of đW\SHsĒ 
A follower of a certain tradition can choose one definition 
and extend it so that it covers other uses. But as I attempted to 
show in this section, if we do so, we miss the point that other 
users of đtypesĒ consider crucial. We can see types as sets and 
construct complex sets to model effectful programs, but we do 
not learn what programs actually do. Or we can treat type 
representing Czech Republic as a set, but it becomes vacuous 
and loses important connection with the external world.  
As we move between different traditions, the meaning and 
the purpose of types changes and it is easy to imagine that this 
will continue for future uses of types. So, what can we do if we 
want to talk about types and still capture all of their rich and 
diverse uses? I believe that we can explain many of those deve-
lopments and find interesting ideas for talking about types by 
looking at philosophy of science. 
 
29 Syme et al. (2013), and Christiansen (2013) 
30 The work of Leinberger et al. (2014) who implement type provider for 
semantic web ontologies makes the link with information theory explicit. 
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 inconsistent and evolving meaning harmful? 
From a rationalistic perspective, my presentation of types is 
disappointing. How can science progress, if we cannot agree on 
the meaning of basic terms? And how can our work improve, 
if the purpose keeps changing without us even noticing? 
Two theories of philosophy of science explore situations 
very similar to those that we can see with types. First, research 
programmes give a view of science where multiple inconsistent 
approaches coexists. Secondly, concept stretching from explains 
how our intuitive understanding of entities evolves. 
Inconsistent theories and research programmes  
/DNDWRVĒVWKHRU\RIUHVHarch programmes gives us a perspective 
that can explain inconsistencies between different definitions 
of đtypeĒ32. In this view, a science consists of multiple comple-
ting research programmes. Each research programme is formed 
by a hard core consisting of assumptions that are never doubted 
and auxiliary protective belt that can be freely modified: 
[Some laws or principles] are not to be blamed for any 
apparent failure. Rather, the blame is to be placed on the 
less fundamental components. A science can then be seen 
as the pragmatic development of the implications of the 
fundamental principles.33 
This theory states that science proceeds in a rational way, but 
only within a research programme. If we judge the work done 
in one research programme through the perspective of another 
one, we can find it inacceptable ď work in another research 
programme will often break fundamental assumptions that we 
subscribe to and will use methods that we do not accept. 
We can use the perspective of research programmes to 
shed some light on types in programming language research. 
Looking at the examples discussed in the previous section, we 
can identify at least three different programmes: 
- The textbook definition by Pierce34 captures the core 
assumptions of one research programme. We can see types 
as sets and come with sound, tractable type systems that 
serve to detect errors. The programme also provides 
standard tools such as syntactic soundness. 
- According to the programme advocated by Benton, types 
should have a meaning (as relations). The methods of the 
programme include denotational approach to semantics. 
- According to another research programme (including Dart, 
TypeScript and, to some, extent F#), types should improve 
 
32 Paradigms and paradigm shifts introduced by Kuhn are also related, but 
they apply to the whole community and so are perhaps less directly 
applicable here, although some developments resemble paradigm shifts. 
33 Chalmers (1999) 
the usability of a programming language, but its proponents 
are willing to sacrifice properties like whole-language safe-
ty. The methods include e.g., using types for editor tooling. 
Describing the research programmes precisely in detail is work 
that I leave to the future historians of science. My main point 
is that looking at our field through this perspective is useful 
and can help us understand how concepts such as types are 
used and why we often fail to find a shared understanding. It 
is simply because we subscribe to different core principles. 
A similar point has been made by Feyerabend who argues 
against the consistency condition, which requires that scientific 
theories should be consistent with previous work:  
[T]he methodological unit to which we must refer [is] a 
whole set of partly overlapping, factually adequate, but 
mutually inconsistent theories.35 
Are the different definitions of types discussed above mutually 
inconsistent? I believe so. It is difficult to see how we could talk 
about logical types from foundations of mathematics and 
unsound types of Dart at the same time. Yet, it is still useful to 
think about both of them as an instance of the same concept! 
Types as sociological boundary objects 
Should we then identify the distinct research programmes and 
name the concept of type differently and unambiguously in 
each of them to avoid confusion? There is more to types. In 
particular, they are what sociologists call boundary objects: 
Boundary objects are objects which are both plastic 
enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to 
maintain a common identity across sites.37  
This definition fits well with how types are used in program-
ming. They are used differently by different communities (fol-
lowing different research programmes), but we are not talking 
about completely different things! Hence, it makes sense to use 
a common name for types across multiple research program-
mes. As boundary objects, types are very valuable entities: 
They have different meanings in different social worlds 
EXWWKHLU VWUXFWXUH LVFRPPRQHQRXJK ƁWRPDNHWKHP
recognizable, a means of translation. The creation and 
management of boundary objects is key in developing and 
maintaining coherence across intersecting social worlds.38 
34 Pierce (2002) 
35 Feyerabend (2010), 20 




In other words, types let us translate interesting ideas between 
different research programmes. Examples are easy to find. 
Tooling that was developed based on types in Java (like auto-
completion) has been adapted and used for writing proofs in 
dependently typed languages, despite having a very different 
notion of type under the cover.  
How meaning changes through concept stretching 
To understand how the meaning of a type changes, we can find 
inspiration in philosophy of mathematics. In Proofs and refuta-
tions, Imre Lakatos tells the story of Euler characteristic of 
polyhedra (ܸ െ ܧ ൅ ܨ ൌ  ?, where ܸǡ ܧǡ ܨ are the numbers of 
vertices, edges and faces) and describes how mathematicians 
face numerous counterexamples that were discovered (such as 
nonconvex polyhedra, polyhedra with tunnels etc.). 
Lakatos introduces the notion of concept stretching, which 
happens when a new counterexample (of a previously incon-
ceivable form) is discovered: 
Then came the refutationists. In their critical zeal they 
stretched the concept of polyhedron, to cover objects that 
were alien to the intended interpretation.39 
Concept stretching takes a concept and extends it to include an 
idea that is not explicitly ruled out by the formal definition, but 
is of a novel form and has not been considered before. 
Concept stretching also happens in the context of types. One 
example is using types to capture effects of a computation. This 
extends the idea of a type, but it also accidentally breaks 
standard interpretations of types (types as sets of values) and 
complicates the standard methods (syntactic soundness). Type 
providers are another example. They relativize the notion of 
safety and also suddenly provide thousands of types (or more) 
and so some of the established methods for working with types 
become unsuitable. (As a down-to-earth example, auto-comple-
tion lists become so long that they now need a search box!) 
,Q/DNDWRVĒV VWRU\ WKHUH DUHPRQVWHU-barrers who try to 
save the original interpretations and methods by labelling the 
newly discovered counterexamples as monsters that should be 
ruled out. However, this does not work: 
The curious thing is that concept stretching goes on surre-
ptitiously: nobody is aware of it, and since everybody's 
'coordinate-system' expands with the widening concept, 
they fall prey to the Ɓ delusion that monster-barring 
narrows concepts, while in fact, it keeps them invariant.40 
 
39 Lakatos (1979), 84 
40 Lakatos (1979), 86 
41 Latour (1987) 
The fact that concept stretching happens secretly is interesting 
for our discussion about types too. For example, the shift from 
&KXUFKĒVsimply typed lambda calculus to types in functional 
languages is larger than generally understood. However, once 
we see types as sets of values, it is very hard to go back and see 
the world through ChurchĒVRULJLQDOSHUVSHFWLYH 
The introduction of unsound type systems is another 
example of concept stretching. Like adding a tunnel through a 
polyhedra, it extends the concept of a type in a previously 
inconceivable direction. In this case, a large part of the prog-
ramming language community reacts as monster-barrers from 
/DNDWRVĒVVWRU\7hat is by labelling unsound type systems as 
monsters and refusing to admit them into a well-behaved 
society. It is not difficult to find modern variations on a quote 
WKDWDSSHDUVLQ&KDUOHV+HUPLWHĒVOHtter from 1893: 
I turn aside with a shudder of horror from this lamentable 
plague of functions which have no derivatives.  
Should we be precise about types? 
Research programmes and concept stretching help us better 
track how types are used. The reader mighW H[SHFW WKDW ,ĒOO
now say that we should take extra care when talking about 
types, document our research programme and watch carefully 
to avoid (or acknowledge) concept stretching.  
Doing this is, indeed, a useful contribution to science, but 
it can only be done in retrospect once we know all the facts. 
As noted by Latour in Science in Action41, there are two sides: 
on the left, we know all the facts and have many strong allies; 
on the right, everything is in the making and under-determined. 
The work on the right is not a black-boxed science (yet), but 
once it becomes a black-box, it is as solid as anything else.  
This explains why we cannot point a finger at interesting 
work that has been unjustly rejected, e.g. for the lack of 
formalism. The things on the right side are not science, because 
they are not science42! Ubiquitous focus on formalism does not 
rule out parts of science. It defines what a science is.  
 
Against the definition of type 
When discussing types, we should be flexible enough to accom-
PRGDWHSHRSOHVXFKDV3KDHGUXVIURP3LUVLJĒV=HQDQGWKH$UW
of Motorcycle Maintenance who identifies Aristotle as the 
founder of the modern scientific approach and laments:  
42 To avoid the tautology, just imagine that the statement on the left talks 
about time ݐ and the statement on the right talks about time ݐ െ  ?. 
7 
 
Phaedrus saw Aristotle as tremendously satisfied with 
this neat little stunt of naming and classifying everything. 
ƁKHVDZKLPDVDSURWRW\SHIRUPDQ\PLOOLRQVRIVHOI-
satisfied and truly ignorant teachers throughout the 
history who have smugly and callously killed the creative 
spirit of their students with this dumb ritual of analysis, 
this blind, rote, eternal naming of things.43 
3LUVLJĒVZRUGLQJPLJKWEHDK\SHUEROHEXWWKHUHLV some truth 
in it. Creative uses of types and other concepts often break 
some of the established rules and principles of the time and we 
only find a way to reconcile them in retrospect. Paul Feyer-
DEHQGĒVSKLORVRSK\SUHVHQWVDVLPLODULGHDEXWPRUHVHULRusly 
and with historical grounding.  
Epistemological anarchism and clarity of terms 
Searching for clarity is worthwhile, especially in retrospect, but 
we should not require it. The problem is that clarity means a 
different thing in retrospect and when new ideas are created. 
Paul Feyerabend explains how the requirement of clarity 
restricts and changes our thinking: 
[T]o 'clarify' the terms of a discussion does not mean to 
study the additional and as yet unknown properties of the 
domain in question which one needs to make them fully 
understood, it means to fill them with existing notions 
from the entirely different domain of logic and common 
VHQVHƁDQGWRWDNHFDUHWKDWWKHSURFHVV of filling obeys 
the accepted laws of logic.44 
New notions of type may not perfectly fit with the established 
understanding. Initially, this may not appear as a conceptual 
shift, but perhaps as a technical fault (that could be corrected). 
But this should not be a reason for rejecting them ď we can 
accommodate the new notions, but only later once the accepted 
laws of logic evolve.  
For example, when types were first used for the tracking 
of effects the work was not rejected, despite the fact that it did 
not clearly describe WKHVWUXFWXUHRIĔVHWRIYDOXHVĕWKDWDW\SH
with effect annotation denotes. One could invent an inelegant 
answer, but this would shift the focus of the work in a much 
less interesting direction. Feyerabend continues as follows: 
So the course of an investigation is deflected into the 
narrow channels of things already understood and the 
possibility of fundamental conceptual discovery is signi-
ficantly reduced.45 
 
43 Pirsig (1999), 360 
44 Feyerabend (2010), 200 
45 Ibid, 200 
7KLV)H\HUDEHQGĒVSRLQWEHDXWLIully describes why we should 
not strictly require clarity. Interesting developments (when 
new research programmes are born) often change the meaning, 
require the development of new methods and ways of thinking. 
Yet, these ideas can only be expressed using imperfect terms 
that are currently available. 
We could argue for the claims made in this section based 
on humanitarian grounds (and Feyerabend did that too), but 
the more important point here is historical. If we look at the 
past developments in science, we can see that )H\HUDEHQGĒV
[epistemological anarchism] is more likely to encourage progress 
than its law-and-order alternatives46. 
How science actually works 
)H\HUDEHQGĒVSRVLWLRQPD\EHH[WUHPHIRUVRPHUHDGHUVbut he 
is not alone. Both Lakatos (speaking of research programmes) 
and also Kuhn (speaking of research paradigms) argue that 
early developments start with vague concepts and even ignore 
experimental failures: 
Early work in a research program is portrayed as taking 
place without heed or in spite of apparent falsifications by 
observation47  
A case could be made to the effect that the typical history 
RI D FRQFHSW Ɓ LQYROYHV WKH LQLWLDO HPHUJHQFH RI WKH
concept as a vague idea, followed by its gradual clarifi-
FDWLRQDVWKHWKHRU\ƁWDNHVDPRUHSUHFLVHƁIRUP48 
In early development of a research programme, the focus is on 
achieving something new (capturing effects of computations, 
providing better developer tools in dynamic environment), but 
other issues that are important for established science (what 
Chalmers calls apparent falsifications) can be ignored. In 
.XKQĒVUHVHDUFKSDUDGLJPVWKHVLWXDWLRQLVVLPLODUď paradigms 
emerge when current approaches start failing, but they emerge 
in imperfect forms. 
However, the difficulty is noticing when a new research 
programme starts to emerge. This is possible to see in 
retrospect, but not during the development itself. Feyerabend 
summarizes this position with his famous slogan: 
To those who look at the rich material provided by history 
and who are not intent on impoverishing it in order to 
please their lower instincts, their craving for intellectual 
security in the form of clariW\SUHFLVLRQŶREMHFWLYLW\ŷŶWUXWKŷ
it will become clear that there is only one principle that can 
46 Feyerabend (2010) 
47 Chalmers (1999), 135 
48 Chalmers (1999), 106 
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be defended under all circumstances and in all stages of 
human development. It is the principle: anything goes.49 
As Feyerabend later saidđDQ\WKLQJJRHVĒ is not a principle, but 
the terrified exclamation of a rationalist who takes a closer look at 
history50. And I believe that the complex developments of the 
notion of types outlined in the introduction also support this 
position.  
Now, this does not mean that we should abandon all prin-
ciples in all situations. This is not what Feyerabend advocates. 
When working within a well-developed area, it makes sense 
follow its principles and exact definitions that it provides: 
We see that the principles of critical raWLRQDOLVP Ɓ
though practiced in special areas, give an inadequate 
account of the past development of science as a whole and 
are liable to hinder it in the future.51 
Looking at the history of science supports the main idea of this 
essay. That is, we should not require a precise definition of the 
QRWLRQRIđW\SHĒ5HTXLULQJFODULW\PHDQVWKDWZHFDQRQO\WDON
about things we already understand ď perhaps in greater detail, 
with more generality and in more elegant ways, but not about 
fundamentally new ideas. 
There are two areas where new ways of thinking about 
types can be especially valuable. The first is in new and previ-
ously unexplored domains. When types are used in a new 
domain, their meaning might change and it can take time before 
we settle on a clear formal definition. The second area is when 
we want to talk about types universally and include many of 
the rich and diverse precise definitions.  
 
Living with undefined types 
A type is not a formal concept that can have a precise defini-
tion. This can be the case in some narrow areas and we can use 
the precise definition within the narrow area, but how can we 
work with types if we want to operate and think outside of a 
particular research programme? 
Philosophy of science describes a number of methods or 
ways of thinking that do not require precise definitions. That 
these provide a useful complement to the rigorous methods 
that we use when operating within a narrow and formalized 
areas of an established research programme.  
 
 
49 Feyerabend (2010), 12 
50 Ibid, vii 
51 Ibid, 160 
There are many theories to look at, but in this essay, I 
explore three ways of thinking about types. These are based on 
how we use types, what are conventional ideas associated with 
types and what we can do with types.  
Language games and how we use types 
One way of understanding the meaning of a term without a 
precise definition is to look at the context in which it is used. 
Feyerabend suggested that this is how terms attain their mea-
ning in early stages of theory development: 
The terms of the new language become clear only when 
the process is fairly advanced, so that each single word is 
the center of numerous lines connecting it with other 
words, sentences, bits of reasoning, gestures which sound 
absurd at first but which become perfectly reasonable 
once the connections are made.52 
7KH SKLORVRSKHU ZKR ILUVW FODLPHG WKDW ĔPHDQLQJ LV XVHĕ LV
Ludwig Wittgenstein. I believe that his ideas on language can 
suggest ways of dealing with undefined terms in science too. 
He describes the idea in Philosophical Investigations as follows: 
For a large class of cases of the employment of the word 
źPHDQLQJŻų though not for all ų this word can be explai-
ned in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the 
language.53 
Similarly, the meaning of a scientific term can be explained by 
its use in the scientific community. When discussing different 
notions of types earlier, we looked at both what types are 
(undefined hierarchy, sets, spaces), but also how they are used 
(avoiding errors, providing documentation, etc.).  
The idea here is that we focus just on how types are used, 
because this is what types are. This may sound unorthodox, 
but it resolves one of the key issues we face when looking for a 
universal notion of type ď studying the use does not require 
consistent definitions.  
To understand types, we can study how they are used in 
different contexts. Wittgenstein calls these contexts language 
games, but what are the language games surrounding types? 
There are natural contexts that already exist and there are a 
lot of them: proving program properties with types, documen-
ting developer intentions with types, improving performance 
with types and so on. The language games also change in time. 
For examSOH WKH ĔXVLQJ W\SHV WR EXLOG IRXQGDWLRQV RI
PDWKHPDWLFVĕlanguage game has been at the birth of types, but 
52 Feyerabend (2010), 200  
53 Wittgenstein (2009), no.43 
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has only regained prominence with the later developments of 
Per Martin-/¤IĒVW\SHWKHRU\ and homotopy type theory.  
However, documenting the existing language games is only 
one part of our investigation: 
It is not the business of philosophy to resolve a con-
WUDGLFWLRQ Ɓ EXW WR UHQGer surveyable the state of 
PDWKHPDWLFVWKDWWURXEOHVXVƁ. [W]e lay down rules, a 
technique, for playing a game and that then, when we 
IROORZWKHUXOHVWKLQJVGRQŷWWXUQRXWDVZHKDGDVVXPHG 
To paraphrase the above quote, we do not need to resolve all 
the inconsistencies between different understandings of types. 
Instead, we can focus on creating interesting new contexts in 
which the concept of a đtypeĒ can be used and explored.  
What would be such language games for exploring proper-
ties of types? One example I can think of is the well-known 
puzzle referred to as the expression problem54. The problem is 
extending a set of objects and functions in two directions ď by 
adding new kinds of objects and new functions. 
For example, objects may represent numerical expressions 
(constant, variable, addition) and functions operations over 
them (pretty printing, evaluation). In some type systems, it is 
easy to add new kinds of objects. In other type systems, we can 
add functions, but adding new objects is hard. 
The language game sets perhaps unreasonable constraints 
(we should not require recompilation), but that is not a flaw. 
Instead, it reveals the abstraction and error-checking capabi-
lities of a system. At the same time, it  can be used for looking 
at a large number of very diverse notions of type. 
The expression problem gives a very specific perspective 
MXVWOLNHVRPHRI:LWWJHQVWHLQĒVlanguage games), but it shows 
how we can talk about types without requiring a clear defi-
nition. To my best knowledge, there are not many puzzles or 
language games similar to the expression problem, and so con-
structing language games to explore other properties of types 
is one interesting open question of this essay.  
Stereotypes and the meaning of types 
Seeing programming language research through the perspec-
tive of competing research programmes explains why different 
communities view types differently, but it makes it difficult to 
say what the meaning of type is outside of the individual re-
search programmes. Intuitively, we still have some overall idea 
about types, so saying that there is no meaning seems wrong. 
One philosopher who addresses this question in the con-
text of meaning of words is Hilary Putnam. However, the 
 
54 Wadler (1998) 
55 Hacking (1983), 75 
IROORZLQJPRWLYDWLRQIURP,DQ+DFNLQJĒVERRNLVDSHUIHFWILW
for the problem addressed in this essay too: 
[W]e need an alternative account of meaning which 
allows that people holding competing or successive theo-
ries may still be talking about the same thing.55 
3XWQDPĒVWKHRU\LVLQWHUHVWLQJEHFDXVHLWJLYHVXVDZD\WRWDON
about meaning in the real setting where different people talk 
about types, but using different perspectives. I find it useful as 
another example showing that we can think about things 
without precise definitions. 
+DFNLQJ LQWURGXFHV 3XWQDPĒV WKHRU\ XVLQJ DQ DQDORJ\
with a dictionary. What would a dictionary definition for a 
programming language concept of type consist of? 
A dictionary begins an entry with some pronounciation 
and grammar, proceeds past etymology to a lot of inform-
ation, and may conclude with examples of usage. 
3XWQDPĒVPHDQLQJLVVSHcified by four components ď syntactic 
marker (type is a countable noun), semantic marker (a category 
to which type belongs, i.e. computer science entity), stereotype 
and extension (set of all things that are type). 
The interesting part of the definition (and the part that is 
interesting for this essay) is stereotype: 
[A] standardized description of features of the kind that 
DUHW\SLFDORUŶQRUPDOŷRUDWDQ\UDWHVWHUHRW\SLFDO7KH
central features of the stereotype generally are criteria ų 
features which in normal situations constitute ways of 
UHFRJQL]LQJLIDWKLQJEHORQJVWRWKHNLQGƁ56 
This is a down-to-earth notion of meaning, but I believe that 
this is how many practitioners of the field think about types. 
We know what features are generally associDWHGZLWKđW\SHVĒ
and we can, certainly, use those to recognize a type. 
Putnam illustrates the idea using tigers as an example. One 
such stereotype about tigers is that they are striped. But a 
white albino tiger is still a tiger. Similarly, a type is a classifi-
cation of values that computations can produce. But a type that 
represents behaviour of computation is also a type. A type is a 
decidable syntactic program property, but a type that cannot 
be effectively decided is still a type. A type can be used to rule out 
errors, but a type that does not rule out all errors is still a type. 
Another useful point made by Hacking is that illustrations 
in children books illustrate the stripiness of tigers to build the 
stereotype. Similarly, the Types lecture notes at the start of 
this essay and computer science textbooks discuss properties of 
56 Putnam, p230 
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type systems to build a stereotype about types. But this does 
not necessarily mean that they give a full account of what a 
type is. Indeed, stereotypes are not exact definitions:  
The fact that a feature (e.g. stripes) is included in the ste-
reotype associated with a word X does not mean that it is 
an analytical truth that all Xs have that feature, nor that 
PRVW;VKDYH WKDW IHDWXUH Ɓ ,I WLJHUV ORVW WKHLU VWULSHV
they would not thereby cease to be tigers.57 
Just like tigers can lose their stripes, types can lose some of their 
stereotypes. The stereotypes associated with the early notion 
of types included their use to avoid paradoxes, but also many 
other things (such as categorization of terms in a formula). The 
avoidance-of-paradoxes stereotype has been lost when types 
started to be used in programming languages, but other stere-
otypes associated with them remained. Similarly, properties 
that we ascribe to types now may not be representative stereo-
types of types in the future. 
:KHQGLVFXVVLQJ:LWWJHQVWHLQĒVODQJXDJHJDPHVLQWKHSUH-
vious section, I concluded with the suggestion that we should 
construct new language games to explore properties of types. 
8QOLNHODQJXDJHJDPHV3XWQDPĒVWKHRU\GRHVQRWVXJJHVWDQ\
new method of inquiry. However, I think that it is useful for 
another reason ď it is perhaps the closest explanation to how 
computer scientists think about types. As such it makes explicit 
some of the aspects of meanings of types. 
We should also keep stereotypes in mind when reading 
textbooks. A textbook description is two things ď a formal defi-
nition within the context of a narrow research programme and 
stereotypes for types in the broader sense. We should not be 
confusing the two! 
Scientific entities and doing things with types 
So far, this essay was focused more on how we think about 
types, but we can also take a practical attitude and look at doing 
things with types. The idea underlying this section is that we 
can do interesting things with types without having a full and 
developed theory of what types are. 
In the context of programming languages, a similar point 
has been made by Richard P. Gabriel in his recent essay: 
[I]n the pursuit of knowledge, at least in software and 
programming languages, engineering typically precedes 
 
57 Putnam (1979), 250 
58 Gabriel (2012) 
59 Hacking (1983), 158 
60 Ibid, 175 
VFLHQFH Ɓ even if science ultimately produces the most 
reliable facts, the process often begins with engineering.58 
I agree with Gabriel that many interesting ideas in program-
ming languages start with engineering or experimentation. This 
might be because experimentation in computing is very cheap 
compared to natural sciences ď but, as a matter of fact, the same 
has been said about science in general. 
Ian Hacking defends a very similar position, which has 
been labelled new experimentalism: 
[I] make no claim that experimental work could exist 
LQGHSHQGHQWO\RIWKHRU\Ɓ,WUHPDLQVWKHFDVHKRZHYHU
that much truly fundamental research precedes any 
relevant theory whatsoever.59 
I will not discuss the details LQWKLVHVVD\+DFNLQJĒVH[FHOOHQW
book provides a number of examples showing that there have 
been important observations in the history of science, which have 
included no theoretical assumptions at all60. 
Another interesting point made by Hacking is that it is the 
theoreticians who appear in the history books. This explains 
why we can easily recall authors of famous theories, but hardly 
remember any famous experiment and experimenters:   
Before thinking about the philosophy of experiments we 
should record a certain class or caste difference between 
the theorizer and the experimenter. It has little to do with 
philosophy. We find prejudices in favour of theory, as far 
back as there is institutionalized science.61 
Despite the prejudices against the experimentalist approach to 
computer science (even the word engineering seems to have 
negative connotations in some circles!), I believe that it is an 
extremely valuable approach. And indeed, there are many 
systems that involve types which were not preceded by a full-
scale theory, but provided useful and novel insights. 
Type providers can be used as an example. They first 
appeared in the F# 3.0 language in 2011, but without a full 
theory that would be usual in theory-founded work. Yet, type 
providers already influenced other languages63 and the theory 
explaining them started appearing too.64 
An important question about experimentalist work in 
programming languages is, how do we observe the results of 
our experiments? (Here, I intentionally avoided using the term 
đHYDOXDWHĒ ZKLFK VXJJHVWV TXDQWLWDWLYH PHDVXUHments; for 
experiments, it is sufficient to observe interesting results.) 
61 Ibid, 150 
63 Christiansen (2013) 
64 Petricek (2015) 
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Types as scientific entities and types in practice 
According to new experimentalists, experimenting is not 
stating or observing, but doing. What matters is how scientific 
entities can be manipulated to cause other interesting effects. 
Hacking uses electrons as an example, but we can similarly 
think about types: 
[F]rom the very beginning people were less testing the 
H[LVWHQFHRIHOHFWURQVWKDQLQWHUDFWLQJZLWKWKHPƁ7KH
more we come to understand some of the causal powers of 
electrons, the more we can build devices that achieve well-
understood effects in other parts of nature.65 
What can we cause with types? I think the new experimentalist 
perspective suggests an important point about programming 
language experiments. We can implement a compiler or a type 
checker for a given type system, but this is merely a different 
way of presenting the same theory. 
When experimenting in programming languages, we need 
to create experiments that somehow interact with the outside 
world. Tools such as theorem provers are an interesting 
example. They have types at their very core, but are used to 
create other valuable things using them. 
The other option is to observe how our experimental 
system can be used in practice. I previously argued that one 
way of presenting such computing experiments is in the form 
of case studies66, but I believe that this is an underexplored area 
with interesting possibilities. For example, the Future of 
Programming workshop67 made it possible to submit (what I 
would call) experiment reports in the form of webcasts. 
There are two more points about new experimentalism 
that I find relevant to work on programming languages and 
W\SHV7RTXRWH&KDOPHUVĒVLQWURGXFWLRQRIWKHSKLORVRSK\: 
It is argued that experimentalists have a range of practi-
cal strategies for establishing the reality of experimental 
effects without needing recourse to large-VFDOHWKHRU\Ɓ
[I]f scientific progress is seen as the steady build-up of the 
stock of experimental knowledge, then the idea of cumu-
ODWLYHSURJUHVVLQVFLHQFHFDQEHUHLQVWDWHGƁ68 
In science, isolating a stable and repeatable experiment is hard 
and experimentalists have practical ways for making repro-
ducible experiments. Quite similarly, programming language 
experimenters or engineers have ways of producing systems 
 
65 Hacking (1983), 262 
66 Petricek (2014) 
67 Available at: http://www.future-programming.org/ 
68 Chalmers (1999), 194 
69 For example, F# type providers can be parameterized by values of 
primitive types (integers, strings, etc.), but not by arbitrary types and, in 
that work in practice (now you can again see the prejudices 
against experimentalism; even the phrase works in practice is 
frowned upon). This is an important point ď for example, some 
of the practical limitations of type providers limit their scope 
to an area where the mechanism works well69. But in theory-
oriented work, such limitations would remove much of the 
complexities and subtleties that theoreticians find interesting. 
The second important point that Chalmers makes is that 
new experimentalism makes it possible to recover the idea of 
cumulative growth of knowledge. As can be seen from my 
introduction, the notion of type is changing and so we cannot 
FODLPZHDUHJHWWLQJFORVHUWRDđSHUIHFWĒW\SHHowever, if we 
accumulate the experiments ď practical problems that can be 
solved with types ď we have a way of talking about growth of 
scientific knowledge. 
To conclude this section, another way of working with 
types is to experiment and see what we can do with types. The 
history of science shows that this experimentalist approach is 
fruitful method. I also believe that we have a unique chance to 
find new and better ways of presenting experimental observa-
tions. The webcast format pioneered at the Future of Program-
ming workshop is a good example.  
Despite the prejudices against experimentalism in both 
science and computing, doing experiments is an important part 
of science and experiment have a life of its own70: 
One can conduct experiment simply out of curiosity to see 
ZKDWZLOOKDSSHQƁ7KHSK\VLFLVW*HRUJH'DUZLQXVHG




This essay was inspired by the frequent misunderstandings 
when discussing types. Although we have good understanding 
of types in narrow domains, I argued that it is impossible to 
give a formal and universal definition of what a type is. Rather 
than seeking the elusive definition that does not exist, we 
should instead look for innovative ways to think about and 
work with types that do not require an exact formal definition. 
To motivate the essay, I started with a brief and incomple-
te history of types. As the examples demonstrate, the meaning 
particular, not by other user-defined types. This would extend the focus of 
the feature from data-access to meta-programming ď this is equally 
interesting problem, but very different and more theoretically complex. 
70 Hacking (1983), xiii 
71 Hacking (1983), 154 
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and the purpose of types is continuously changing and different 
communities have different core beliefs of what a type is. In 
philosophy of science, this is known as concept stretching and 
research programmes. If we look at the history, we find some 
structure and precise definitions locally, but this can never 
capture the full complexity of scientific reality and requiring 
such precision can even harm scientific progress. 
It we want to talk about types outside of a narrow research 
programme, we need to find ways of dealing with types 
without a precise definition. I proposed three alternatives ď 
those are based on how we use types (inspired by Wittgen-
VWHLQĒV ODnguage games), what is the conventional idea of type 
EDVHGRQ3XWQDPĒVVWHUHRW\SHVDQGZKDWZHFDQdo with types 
LQVSLUHG E\ +DFNLQJĒV QHZ H[SHULPHQWDOLVP I believe that 
these provide worthwhile methods of inquiry that can provide 
interesting insights into what types are outside of a narrow 
boundary delimited by a particular formal definition. 
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